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THE EXTENSION OF JUDICIAL POLICY:
ZONING PRACTICE AND EXHAUSTION
OF REMEDIES
By RICHARD L. WEXLER*
Exhaustion is an occasional cause of death after
severe operations.
Ericksen
The Oxford UniversalDictionary,3rd Ed.
I strongly wish for what I faintly hope:
Like the day-dreams of melancholy men,
I think and think on things impossible,
Yet love to wander in that golden maze.
John Dryden
1631-1700
Rival Ladies, III, i
INTRODUCTION

In the forty-three years following the landmark decision in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Reality Co., zoning practice has more

and more become an administrative one.

State courts have

demonstrated an ever-increasing reluctance to make zoning
decisions.2 Illinois has been in the forefront of the development

of the judicial policy requiring exhaustion of non-judicial reme-

dies,3 in all but a few situations, before legal process can be in*Instructor, The John Marshall Law School, partner of firm of Wexler,
Kane & Rosenzweig. Author of articles appearing in The John Marshall
Journal of Practice and Procedure, The Illinois Bar Journal,The Journal of
Housing, and The Administrative Law Review. Serves as Zoning Law Consultant for Illinois State Zoning Laws Study Commission.
1272 U.S. 865 (1926).
2 See Metcalf v. County of Los Angeles, 24 Cal. 2d 267, 148 P.2d 645
(1944); West v. City of Wichita, 118 Kan. 328, 234 P. 978 (1925) ; State ex
rel. Lieux v. Village of Westlake, 154 Ohio St. 412, 96 N.E.2d 414 (1951).
The following 1963 Associated Press news release is referred to in the book
THE ZONING GAME:
Philadelphia, Nov. 30 (AP) - Chief Justice John C. Bell said today
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court no longer will hear zoning and other
cases of little significance.
The action is expected to cut the court's case load by 5 to 20 per
cent.
Justice Bell said the action is aimed primarily at appeals on rulings
by zoning boards governing establishments such as neighboring beauty
shops.
R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 104 (1966).
3 "Exhaustion of remciies" as used herein will refer to that doctrine
which determines at what stage a person may secure review of administrative or legislative action. For definitions of the doctrine of a more complex, and therefore, perhaps more satisfying nature, see 2 AM. JuR. 2d Ad-
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itiated. To the zoning practitioner, the question of when legal
remedies can be invoked in zoning questions has become an ever
more difficult conundrum. The following analysis of the developing law on exhaustion of remedies reveals the sources of confusion in zoning law. Hopefully, it also indicates possibilities
for a higher plateau of practice in Illinois zoning.
EXHAUSTION:

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE IN ILLINOIS

No area of technical and legal expertise produces more confusion in more areas of litigation than does zoning. Standing to
sue,4 highest and best use," amortization,6 and compatibility are
but a few of the most obvious aspects of the difficulties involved
in zoning litigation. Yet, the totality and complexity of issues
that zoning produces will never be heard by a court of law unless
the parties have exhausted their administrative and/or8 legislative remedies.
It is appropriate to the present litigious confusion that the
exhaustion doctrine arose in Illinois in an air of bewilderment.
The first indication of the court's insistence upon complete "exhaustion" appeared almost immediately after the Illinois Supreme Court approved zoning as a proper exercise of the police
power.9 In Deynzer v. City of Evanston,10 a property owner
attempted to overturn an Evanston zoning ordinance as unconstitutional and to remove a cloud on title caused by an ordinance
prohibiting development of the property for apartment use.
Plaintiff had not attempted to have the ordinance amended or
its application varied as to her property. The court required
her to first seek relief from the city authorities: "[If appellant
feels that she has been aggrieved by the classifications of the
zoning ordinance her recourse is to the board of appeals. The
action of that body is reviewable by the courts."'1 It was thus
ministrative Law §595 (1966); 2 C.
PLANNING §2 (1969).

RATHKOPE,

THE LAW OF ZONING AND

4222 E. Chestnut St. Corp. v. Board of Appeals 14 Ill. 2d 190, 152
N.E.2d 465 (1958); Garner v. County of DuPage, 8 Il. 2d 155, 133 N.E.2d

303 (1956).
5 Hartung v. Village of Skokie, 22 Ill. 2d 485, 177 N.E.2d 328 (1961).
6 Douglas v. Village of Melrose Park, 389 Ill. 98, 58 N.E.2d 864 (1945);
McCoy v. City of Knoxville, 41 Ill. App. 2d 378, 190 N.E.2d 622 (1963) ; People ex rel. Delgado v. Morris, 334 Ill. App. 557, 79 N.E.2d 839 (1948).
7 Ward v. Village of Skokie 26 Ill. 2d 415, 186 N.E.2d 529 (1962).
8 As the discussion which follows will show there is confusion as to which
"type" of remedy is being exhausted -

legislative or administrative.

In

part, this confusion has been aided and abetted by the Illinois General Assembly in creating a plethora of methods for amending and varying municipal zoning regulations. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, §11-13-1, et seq. (1969).
9 The landmark Illinois zoning opinion, City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill.
84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925), was filed on the same day as Deynzer v. City of
Evanston, 319 Ill. 226, 149 N.E. 790 (1925). See text at notes 10-12 infra.
10 319 Ill.
226 149 N.E 790 (1925).

1 Id. at 234,

149 N.E. at 793.
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with simplicity that the rule requiring exhaustion was born. It
was to live for four years.
In 1926, the year of Deynzer, the Chicago City Council
amended its zoning ordinance for a small portion of the city,
changing the permitted uses from commercial and industrial to
apartment and residential. This amendment was the subject of
the 1930 opinion in Phipps v. City of Chicago.12 While Chicago's
then zoning ordinance required public hearings on zoning amendments by a board of appeals, none was held in Phipps prior to
the passage of the amendment. Defeated in the trial court, the
city urged reversal on the basis of plaintiff's failure to exhaust
legislative and administrative remedies. Curiously, the Illinois
Supreme Court distinguished Deynzer summarily:
The facts in that case are not identical with the facts here presented and that case is not conclusive of this question. The
question of the constitutionality and validity of an amendment
to an original zoning ordinance involving only one piece of property where rights had become fixed was not in question in that
13

case.

Yet this is exactly what Mrs. Deynzer had placed in issue four
years earlier. The court in Phipps held:
If the amendatory ordinance was unconstitutional, null and void,
appellees were not compelled to inferentially admit its binding
force and effect by appeal to the board of appeals but they had
the right to file a bill in equity. They had no adequate remedy14
at law, and equity had full and complete jurisdiction of the cause.
Thus, Deynzer was forgotten. A quarter-century later Phipps

was to meet a most curious fate.
Bright!!.!
The property owner, unhappy over the application of the general
terms of the ordinance to his property, has been understandably
perplexed over which source of relief, 'administrative' or 'legislative,' he should seek. For three decades his one source of
comfort was the knowledge that he could avoid the uncertain,
often distasteful, frequently tedious and repetitive efforts to
obtain local relief by going directly to court . . . to ask that the
ordinance be declared invalid insofar as his property was concerned. 15
With Bright v. City of Evanston," the Illinois Supreme Court
12 339 Ill. 315, 171 N.E. 289 (1930).

is Id. at 321, 171 N.E. at 291 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 324, 171 N.E. at 292-3.
15 Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Administration in Illinois, 26
U. CHI. L. REv. 509, 521-22 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Babcock].
16 10 Ill. 2d 178, 139 N.E.2d 270 (1956).
The suddenness of Bright is possibly measured by the veritable flood of
law review articles it produced almost contemporaneously with the filing of
the opinion. The best of these include: Babcock, supra note 15, at 522-32;
Fox, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies in Zoning Disputes, 40 CHI.

B. REC. 119 (1958) ; Lawton, Jr., ProceduralImplications of Recent Zoning
Decisions, 40 CHI. B. REc. 15 (1958).

1969J

The Extcinsion of .idiciai Policy

ended direct court review with unexpected suddenness. The
plaintiff in Bright owned property in a zoning district restricted
to single-family residences and on which he wished to erect a
multiple-unit apartment structure. Apparently relying on the
quiescence of the previous years, and not wishing to subject himself to the dangers of public hearing, he sought court relief alleging the Evanston ordinance's unconstitutionality as applied to
his land. When the trial court held the ordinance void as to
Bright, Evanston appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court.
Totally ignoring its Phipps decision, the Illinois Supreme Court
looked to the holdings of other jurisdictions" 7 to support its surprising reversal:
In the case at bar the zoning ordinance has made provision for
variation in particular cases by application to the board of appeals
which is empowered to make recommendations to the city council
with respect thereto. The plaintiff has not seen fit to apply for
such a variation. He does not complain of the zoning ordinance as
a whole, but claims only that the classification of his lot for
residential rather than commercial uses infringes his constitutional
rights. Under such circumstances he should apply in the first instance to the board of appeals, and if unsuccessful there he can seek
judicial relief. His action for a declaratory judgment without first
exhausting his administrative remedies will not lie.' s
Thus the plaintiff was ordered to exhaust his administrative
remedies prior to seeking court relief. As the preeminent zoning
authority, Richard F. Babcock, analyzed:
Whatever questions this decision did not answer, however many
new sources of uncertainty the opinion raised, the Court did appear
to say unequivocally that a property owner had to make some effort
to obtain local relief, where available, before he could go to court
to challenge the ordinance as it applied to his property. Stripped
of all unnecessary verbiage, that is what the Bright decision
stands for.19
Unfortunately, "unnecessary verbiage" deposited a myriad of
problems on the doorsteps of Illinois attorneys.
How did Bright become a paradigm of confusion? In ignoring Phipps, the court chose to rely on a series of decisions of
foreign jurisdictions:
"[RInterestingly, in all of tLhe out-ofstate cases the administrative agencies had the final power to
grant or deny the change being litigated while the Evanston
Board did not. '2 0 Chief Justice Klingbiel, writing Bright for the
court, makes five direct references" ' and many oblique ones to the
17

E.g., Central Trust Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 62 Ohio App. 139, 23

N.E.2d 450 (1939); People v. Calvar Corp., 286 N.Y. 419, 36 N.E.2d 644
(1941) ; City of South Bend v. Marckle, 215 Ind. 74, 18 N.E.2d 764 (1939).
18 10 Ill. 2d 178, 186, 139 N.E.2d 270, 274 (1956).
19 Babcock, supra note 15, at 522.
20 Fox, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies in Zoning Disputes, 40

CHI. B. REc. 119 (1958).
21 10 Ill. 2d 178, 180, 182, 183, 185, 186, 139 N.E.2d 270, 272, 272-73, 274,
274, 274.
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requirement of exhaustion of "administrative" remedies, even
though the Evanston administrative board was merely advisory
all final decisions being vested in the Evanston City Council. 22
The Bright court left a minor gap by creating a de minimus exception:
A review of applicable authorities would seem to indicate that
where it is claimed the effect of an ordinance as a whole is to unconstitutionally impair the value of the property and destroy its
marketability, direct judicial relief may be afforded without prior
resort to remedies under the ordinance. . . . Under this rule one
who seeks relief from an ordinance on the ground that it is void
in its entirety is not obliged to pursue the machinery of the
ordinance itself for his remedy. 2 !

Why did the court choose the Bright path? Zoning experts can
only speculate retrospectively. The Illinois courts, with increasing vigor, have asserted their distaste for being imposed upon as
"super zoning commissions." - 4 The Illinois Supreme Court, with
an over-burdened calendar, anticipated a flood of direct appeals
since most zoning cases raised questions of the constitutionality
of zoning ordinances. Yet, whatever the speculation, there can
be no doubt that the Illinois Supreme Court sees zoning as a
question of purely local concern:
In the absence of outrageous discrimination the court wants to
avoid the hopeless task of weighing, from briefs and extracts filed
in Springfield, the relative merits of a plea affecting a parcel of
land at a street intersection in Carlinville, South Beloit, Chicago
25
or Arlington Heights.

Notwithstanding the criticism of local administrative and
art. IV (1940).
10 Ill. 2d 178, 184-85, 139 N.E.2d 270, 274 (1956) citing Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) and Dowsey v. Village of
Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931).
24 Audino v. Board of Appeals, 75 Ill.
App. 2d 347, 221 N.E.2d 34 (1966)
(Abstract Decision General No. 50,797) ; Miller v. Board of Appeals, 33 Ill.
App. 2d 163, 178 N.E.2d 658 (1961) (Abstract Decision General No. 48, 272) ;
Rosenfeld v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 19 Ill. App. 2d 447, 154 N.E.2d 323
(1958) (Abstract Decision General No. 47, 440).
25 Babcock,
The New Chicago Zoning Ordinance, 52 Nw. U.L. REV.
174, 176 (1957). Babcock's analysis is no doubt correct even thirteen years
after its publication. The tragedy of such a state of supreme court mind
was beautifully articulated by Mr. Justice Frederich Hall, dissenting in
Vickers v. Township Comm. 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 233 (1963):
The majority decides that this particular municipality may constitutionally say, through exercige of the zoning power, that its residents
may not live in trailers - or in mobile homes, to use a more descriptive
term. I am convinced such a conclusion in this case is manifestly wrong.
Of even greater concern is the judicial process by which it is reached
and the breadth of the rationale. The import of the holding gives almost boundless freedom to developing municipalities to erect exclusionary walls on their boundaries, according to local whim or selfish
desire, and to use the zon'ng power for aims beyond its legitimate purposes. Prohibition of mobile home parks, although an important issue
in itself, becomes in this larger aspect, somewhat a symbol.
Id. at 252-53, 181 A.2d at 1 10. See also Note 59 Nw. U.L. REV.345 (1964).
22 EVANSTON, ILL., ZONING ORDINANCE
23
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legislative zoning actions, 2 local zoning decisions are given a
court decreed respect as if the agencies making those decisions
were expert bodies "entrusted by the legislature to enforce the
27provisions of the Zoning Law.

Regardless of the "whys and hows," the areas of confusion
are patent. In the thirteen years since Bright, the courts have
failed to clear the air; and they have, in some instances, with the
greatest of care, compounded the felony.
BEYOND

Bright

-

CREATIVE CHAOS

In Kennedy v. City of Chicago,8 the Illinois Supreme Court

had its first opportunity 2 to return a zoning matter to either
the trial court or the municipal legislative body under the Bright
doctrine that "a determination of whether the ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable is premature":" until "administrative" remedies are exhausted. In Kennedy, the property owner
plaintiff, without seeking legislative relief as provided in the Chicago zoning ordinance,-1 filed a declaratory judgment action to
hold the Chicago ordinance invalid as to his land. The court,
while reversing for the municipality on other grounds, stated:
In entertaining the appeal as a matter within our jurisdiction, we
note the record presented makes no disclosure of whether the ordinance in question provides appellee with an administrative remedy
for the relief sought, or whether such remedy had not been exhausted, so as to bring the appeal within our recent decision in
32
Bright v. City of Evanston.

While it is axiomatic that a court may raise questions as to its
own jurisdiction sua sponte;":1 and while the court herein could
have taken judicial notice of the administrative provisions of the
Chicago ordinance ;34 it was with some degree of disingenuousness
that the Kennedy court chose to utilize the rubric of appellate
law that the burden is on the appellant to raise all issues meriting
26 See, e.g., Wexler, A Zoning Ordinance Is No Better Than Its Administration - A Platitude Proved, 1 JOHN MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 74 (1967);
Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in
Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273 (1962).
27 Chapmald Realty Corp. v. Board of Standards, 76 N.Y.S.2d 296, 298
(1948); cf. Behnke v. President & Bd. of Trustees, 366 Ill. 516, 9 N.E.2d
232 (1937).
28 11 Ill. 2d 302, 142 N.E.2d 697 (1957).
29 The court, in Fox v. City of Springfield, 10 Ill. 2d 198, 139 N.E.2d
732 (1957), had an apparent opportunity to apply Bright immediately, but
overlooked the same. This decision has been described as "apparently contradictory, and certainly inconsistent." Fox, Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies in Zoning Disputes, 40 CHI. B. REc. 119, 120 (1958).
30 Bright v. City of Evanston, 10 Ill. 2d 178, 180, 139 N.E.2d 270, 272
(1956).
31 11 Ill. 2d 302, 304, 142 N.E.2d 697, 698 (1957).
32

Id.

3

3 Guttman v. Schiller, 23 Ill. 2d 323, 178 N.E.2d 387 (1961); Impey v.

City of Wheaton, 60 Ill. App. 2d 99, 208 N.E.2d 419 (1965).
34 Cf. Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook, 13 Il1. 2d 493, 150 N.E.2d 97
(1958). See text at notes 37-41 infra.
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reversal, 31 thus avoiding an opportunity to solidify its Bright
holding. Yet Kennedy was to be a warning to municipalities to
raise the issue of exhaustion whenever possible.
The next case of import", in the Bright syndrome was to be
Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook. :' in this 1958 case, the plaintiff was advised prior to a hearing by an agent of the Cook County
Board of Appeals that the Board would recommend that his petition for a zoning change be rejected. Relying upon this ex parte
advice, plaintiff initiated a declaratory judgment action. Commenting on Bank of Lyons, Babcock observed, "both parties
urged the Court in their brief to mark a clear path through the
Bright tanglewood. ' ' :' The court refused, holding under Bright:
The necessity for making application before the board is not dispensed with because the application may be denied. The rule requiring resort to an administrative agency in the first instance is
in the interest of orderly procedure. It cannot be avoided by evidence of an intent to deny the relief sought. ::9
As in Kennedy, the municipality in Bank of Lyons failed to
raise the "ripeness" issue under its zoning ordinance administrative machinery. But curiously, this time the court dove in, examined the Cook County ordinance sua sponte, found an available "administrative" remedy, and required exhaustion.40 As Babcock noted:
In neither the Bright case nor the Bank of Lyons case ...did the
Court endeavor to analyze the differences between the various
methods of local relief, such as variations, amendments and special
uses, and to explain the significance of the Bright decision in terms
of these various sources of local relief. Consequently, the Bright
and Bank of Lyons cases provide no Rosetta stone by which the
multiplicity of local administrative-legislative remedies may be
correlated into a logical method of procedure. If the Court chose to
innovate with Bright, it should
have sensed the duty to complete
4
the job with Bank of Lyons. 1
The first attempt by the Illinois Supreme Court to explain
the Bright doctrine appeared in Herman v. Village of Hillside.42
The plaintiffs in Herman sought to have an amendment of the
35Perez v. Janota, 107 Ill.
App. 2d 90, 246 N.E.2d 42 (1969); Libman
v. Gipson, 93 Ill.
App. 2d 62, 235 N.E.2d 670 (1968).
36Other cases intervened between Kennedy and Bank of Lyons but added
little to the Bright doctrine. These include: Honeck v. County of Cook, 12
Ill. 2d 257, 146 N.E.2d 35 (1957); Payne v. Pullman Co., 13 Ill. App. 2d 105,
141 N.E.2d 83 (1957) (which was the first application of Bright in a nonzoning situation) ; Sheridan Shores, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 13 Ill. App. 2d
377, 141 N.E.2d 739 (1957); East Maine Tp. Community Ass'n v. Pioneer
Trust & Say. Bank 15 Ill.
App. 2d 250, 145 N.E.2d 777 (1957).
s713 Ill. 2d 49A, 150 N.E.2d 97 (1958).
38 Babcock supra note 15, at 525.
39 13 Ill. 2d 493, 497, 150 N.E.2d 97, 98 (1958), citing 279 U.S. 159, 20809 (1929).
40 13 ill. 2d 493, 150 N.E.2d 97 (1958).
41 Babcock, supra note 15, at 526.
42 15 Ill.
2d 396, 155 N. E.2d 47 (1958).
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village zoning ordinance declared unconstitutional as to them and
void as it prohibited expansion of their particular use of the
property. Plaintiffs had already been denied an amendment by
recommendation of the Village Board of Appeals and resolution
of the corporate authorities, but, the village argued, under
Bright, plaintiffs should have sought a variation from those same
bodies before suit. The court affirmed for plaintiffs and explained Bright thusly:
The reason for the rule ...is to give the municipal authorities
an opportunity to correct invalid regulation before becoming involved in litigation. They. [Bright and Bank of Lyons] are distinguishable from the case before us in that ample opportunity
was given the village. . . The same board of appeals would have
had jurisdiction over a variation, and it is unreasonable to assume
that it would reverse itself and grant practically the same relief.
To insist on the additional useless step would merely give lip
service to a technicality and thereby increase costs and delay the
administration of justice, which is the very thing we are trying
to avoid. The action here taken was a reasonable 4equivalent
within
:
the meaning and spirit of the cases above cited.
The situation with respect to Bright remained static until
the 1961 case, Howard v. Lawton.4 The Herman sequence was
reversed - the municipality arguing in Howard that plaintiff,
4
who had been denied a variation by the Board of Appeals, 5
should have sought an amendment before seeking the court's
aid. The late Justice House as he did in Herman, spoke for the
Illinois Supreme Court in Howard, but in this case Bright was
to be struck a seemingly severe blow:
Defendants [City] rely upon the rule laid down in Bright .. .
in support of their theory. The Bright doctrine does not apply
here because the Chicago zoning ordinance provides that all decisions of the board of appeals shall be final administrative determinations reviewable by a court, while under the Evanston ordinance all final decisions on variations were vested solely in the
city council. The Bright case
was a declaratory judgment action,
4
not administrative review. "

Was the Bright rule to be restricted to suits growing out of
legislative determinations only? One might get that impression.
Yet Justice House, who had seemingly cleared the air with the
imprimatur of a unanimous court, came full circle less than one
year later in Reilly v. City of Chicago :4
43 Id. at 408, 155 N.E.2d at 53 (emphasis added).
44 22 Il1. 2d 331, 175 N.E.2d 556 (1961).
Again, intervening cases (between He-nan and Howard) were less than edifying. See, e.g., Dalkoff v.
City of Rock Island, 17 II. 2d 342, 161 N.E.2d 292 (1959) ; Eckhardt v.
City of Des Plaines, 13 Il1. 2d 562, 150 N.E.2d 621 (1958) ; Stemwedel v.
Village of Kenilworth, 14 Ill. 2d 470, 153 N.E.2d 79 (1958).
4.Under the Chicago Zoning Ordinance, decisions of its Board of Appeals on zoning variations and variations in the nature of a special use are
final decisions. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE, ch. 194A (1969).
4622 Ill.
2d 331, 334, 175 N.E.2d 556, 558 (1961).
4724 Ill. 2d 148.181 N.E.2d 175 (1962).
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The elementary doctrine laid down in the Bright case is that, except
only where the validity of an ordinance as a whole is attacked, an
effort must be made to obtain relief at the local community level
before the plaintiff seeks relief from the courts ....
The requirement for seeking relief at the local level is equally
cogent whether the appropriate remedy be through the board of
local legislative body, and has been so recognized
appeals or the
4
,
by this court.
While ruminating the House opinions, Illinois attorneys also faced
the Illinois Supreme Court's last attempt to explain Bright.
"CURIOUSER AND CURIOUSER!"

In County of Lake v. MacNeal,4 the court cleared the air as
to the impact of Bright on zoning practice. The county brought
suit to enjoin the MacNeals from allegedly violating the county
zoning ordinance. The defendants had attempted to expand
their recreational facility (a legal non-conforming use) to adjacent land zoned residential. The MacNeals counterclaimed, alleging that the zoning ordinance as applied to the second parcel
was unconstitutional and void. The county responded to the
counterclaim by invoking the Bright doctrine asking dismissal,
"[i]n contending that the same rule applies where the property
owner is the defendant to an action by the local authority to enforce its ordinance, plaintiff first reasons that the Bright rule is
'
jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional."
o To this argument the
court responded: "This premise is not true, nor has the rule
been so construed since its adoption. ' 5
The court further
stated:
The Bright rule did not stem from legislative or constitutional
command, but is no more than an expression of *judicial policy
prompted by the circumstance that zoning is legislative and
administrative in nature, not judicial, and which is aimed at
providing the local authority an opportunity to correct error and
to settle disputes locally before there is judicial intervention 2
The court was again unequivocal - Br ght was not meant to
be jurisdictional; it was an "expression of judicial policy" and no
more. Consequently, Bright would be applied on an ad hoc
basis to all cases in the future -- just as for every action there is
an equal opposite reaction, with Bright 'for every forthright
statement there is an equal and opposite equivocation.
After MacNeal in instances wherein municipalities had
manifest an attitude through denial of variations5 3 or amend48

49

50

Id. at 349, 181 N.E.2d 175.
24 Ill. 2d 253, 181 N.E.2d 85 (1962).
Id. at 259, 181 N.E.2d 85, 89 (emphasis added).

51 Id.

Id.
5s See, e.g., Horan v. Foley, 39 I1. A pp. 2d 458, 188 N.E.2d 877 (1963)
River Forest State Bank & Trust Co. v. Zoning Bd., 34 I1. App. 2d 412, 181
N.E.2d 1 (1961).
52

Thc lEtInsion of./sidici

'olicy

ments'" an aggrieved party could proceed to suit without fuIltIer
administrative or legislative action; however, in every instance
the Illinois courts reserved the right to invoke Bright, on aln apparently discretionary basis.35 Bright has been applied by the Illinois courts on a case by case basis as if the "exhaustion" doctrine
were a Siamese twin of that eternal aphorism of zoning practice:
"[Tihe validity of each zoning ordinance must be determined on
its own facts and circumstances .... ..
Any rule that is applied in an ad hoc, discretionary manner
creates a treacherous path for the litigant - open to costly abuse
and unnecessary speculation. While the course of true exhaustion never does run true, it can and must be simplified in Illinois
if the courts' interpretations of Bright's purpose are ever to be
realized "to prevent delay in the administration of justice." '
A RULE OF JUDICIAL POLICY?
While there is little doubt that the legal rather than practical basis for the rule requiring "exhaustion of remedies" is that
the rule constitutes a doctrine of self-limitation which the courts
have evolved in marking out the boundary lines between the
powers of the courts and those of administrative agencies, the
pious cliche of MacNeal - that the Bright rule is one of
judicial policy - is of little aid to the courts or litigants as to
where and under what facts the rule will be applied.
At the federal level, the "exhaustion" rule "is to be considered a mandatory requirement - a rule of judicial administration, and not merely one governing the exercise of discretion.""
Further, in instances where the statutory authority vests exclusive jurisdiction in the administrative agency, the federal courts,
have held the "exhaustion" rule to be jurisdictional." ' It would
appear that the federal rule, insofar as it delimits judicial discretion as to "exhaustion." would be welcomed by the Illinois
courts which find the exercise of discretion in zoning matters
an area more properly the concern of the local authorities.
.14
See, e.g., National Brick Co. v. City of Chicago, 92 11. App. 2d 192,
App. 2d 62,
235 N.E.2d 301 (1968); Fiore v. City of Highland Park, 76 Ill.
221 N.E.2d 323 (1966).
15 See. e.g.,
Village of Bourbonnais v. Herbert, 86 111. App. 2d 367, "29
N.E.2d 574 (1967) (wherein the court held tho validity of the ordinance
as a whole was in issue) ; Westfield v. City of Chciago, 26 Il1. 2d 526, 187
N.E.2d 208 (1962).
56LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 12 111. 2d 40, 46, 145 N.E.2d
65, 69 (1957).
5 Sulzberger v. County of Peoria, 29 Ill.
2d 532, 540, 194 N.E.2d 287, 291
(1963).
58 F.

COOPER,

ADMINISTRATIVE

AGENCIES AND THE

COURTS

322 (1951).

See also Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938): Berger,
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE L.J. 981 (1939).
" Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, :131 U.S. 752 (1947).
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A more reasonable suggestion, published earlier,6 has been
developed by Cornell University's John Reps.6 1 Reps' scheme
provides for review of all local administrative zoning decisions
I). a state review agency. This agency would consist of expert
personnel, whereas today's local administrative agencies do not.
Judicial review of the state agency's decisions would be restricted
by statute to procedural discrepancies only.';" Those who argue
against the interposition of another agency in the zoning process
must remember that courts apparently do not want to be involved
in zoning questions ;":nor are they technically prepared to resolve zoning questions. The Reps plan restricts the court's province to the procedural and constitutional issues that are its
proper jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION

Bright v. City of Evanston has been at one and the same
time multifarious and nefarious. In too many instances Bright's
fruits have been the bitter ones of chaos and uncertainty when
the zoning process, which Bright was to help control, is supposedly a legal means of assuring order in urban life.
To some the ad hoc nature of determining whether "exhaustion" has been accomplished is a pleasant prospect.
[I]t is fair to conclude that the rules established by the Illinois
courts regarding the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies are well balanced and probably provide4 a maximum of
6
administrative efficiency and judicial protection.
It is submitted that a reading of the Bright line might tend
to put in question such an amiable conclusion. Over two decades ago the Illinois Supreme Court's attitude toward zoning
was aptly described as "a study in uncertainty."65 Today, the
court's attitude is more exact:
Of course there will be zoning cases that question the validity of

particular provisions of the enabling statute, or that involve the
uise of new and unfamiliar techniques. A case of this type, that
presents novel and substantial constitutional issues of concern to
loBlucher, Is Zoning Wagging the Dog, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNIN( OFFICIALS, PLANNING 1955, at 96, 100 (1956)- Babcock, The Un-

happy State of Zoning Admini.qtration in Illinois, 26 U. &i. L. REV. 509, 538
(1959).
61 Reps, Requiem for Zoning, C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE
823-36 (1968).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Grippo, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Need or Nuisance?,
50 ILL. B.J. 474, 489 (19c2); cf. Murphy, Administrative Change and Judicial Relief in Zoning, 46 ILL. B. J. 884 (1958).
65 Babcock, The Illin, ;sSupreme Court and Zoning: A Study in Uncerfainty. 15 U. CHI. L. m,. 37 (1947).
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every community in the State, will sustain a direct appeal to this
Court. 66

From the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court has not
reflected upon the impact of Bright for seven years - but has
instead chosen not to do so' 7 - one can only conclude that the

court feels the issue of "exhaustion" is nc longer a "novel and
substantial" constitutional issue. Yet, as Bright has an impact
upon administrative law issues other than zoning,"8 it is time
that the court reexamine, reanalyze and rethink its position on
this vital issue.
With ruin upon ruin, rout on rout,
Confusion worse confounded.
Milton, ParadiseLost

66 First Nat'l Bank v. City of Evanston, 30 111. 2d 479, 486 .197 N.E.2d
705, 708-709 (1964). For two contrasting analyses of First National Buick,
.see Bosselman, Substantial Constitutional Questions: Are Zoning Cases Sui

Generis? 53 ILL. B.J. 752 (1965) ; and Baum, Substantial Constitutional

Questions: Tie First National Bank Case in Perspective, 53 ILL. B.J. 753
(1965).

67 This is not to say that the Illinois courts have not applied Bright, ('.g.,
Westfield v. City of Chicago, 26 Ill. 2d 526, 187 N.E.2d 208 (1982) ; Van
Laten
68 v. City of Chicago, 28 I1. 2d 157. 190 N.E.2d 717 (1963).
See, e.g., Illinois appellate court's opinion in National Brick Co. 1.
City of Chicago, 92 Ill. App. 2d 192. 235 N.E.2d 301 (1968). Village of
Bourbonnais v. Herbert, 86 Ill. App. d 367. 229 N.E.2d 574 (1967) ; Fiorr
v. City of Highland Park, 76 I1. App. 2d 62, 221 N.E.2d 323 (1966).

